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ABSTRACT 
Preferred modes of thinking, otherwise known as biases, have been well 
documented in adult reasoning and decision-making (Evans, 2003; Gilovich, 
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986). Researchers have explained these biases by proposing that the basis for 
them is a system of thought that relies mostly on intuition and “gut feelings” 
rather than logical analysis of the situation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). According to standard dual-process theories, intuition is 
described as a thought process so quick, it is automatic and, at times 
unconscious; conversely, analytical thinking is slow and steady, involving 
analysis and conscious deliberation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Though several 
dual-process models for cognition have been proposed, including system 
1/system 2, prototype/willingness, and the hot/cold empathy gap, only fuzzy-trace 
theory offers concrete predictions concerning development that are consistent 
with known data (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). For 
example, research has shown that adults display greater reasoning biases than 
children, in that adults are more likely than children to process and use 
extraneous information, such as inconsequential differences in wording, in their 
decisions (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Reyna & Ellis, 1994). Of interest for the 
current study, fuzzy-trace theory posits that different ways of processing lead to 
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different outcomes in risk-taking behavior. Further, fuzzy-trace theory proposes a 
framework that explains how risk perception changes across the lifespan and 
how these changes often lead to less risk-taking from childhood and adolescence 
into adulthood (Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2018; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & 
Farley, 2006). 
Keywords: risk-taking, fuzzy-trace theory, criminality, decision-making, framing 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) is an empirically supported theory about 
memory, judgment, and decision-making across the life span (Reyna, 2012; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 2011, 1995, 1991). The central idea of fuzzy-trace theory is 
that different mental representations are encoded, stored, retrieved, and 
forgotten separately and roughly in parallel (Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; Reyna, 
2012; Reyna & Casillas, 2009). These memory representations include gist and 
verbatim representations. Gist representations are memory forms of the absolute 
meaning or substance of a construct without regard to the exact numbers, words, 
or pictures (Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; Reyna, 2012). In other words, gist is a 
symbolic representation of meaning for each stimulus (Reyna, 2012). 
Conversely, verbatim memory is the surface form representation of memory, 
including exact numbers, words, and pictures (Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; 
Reyna, 2012). “Fuzzy-trace” refers to the difference between “fuzzy” gist 
representations and vivid verbatim representations (Reyna & Casillas, 2009). In 
general, adults exemplify a fuzzy-processing preference, wherein information is 
encoded in both gist and verbatim representations (Reyna, 2012). The default 
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decision is to allow less precise, gist representations to set the course of action 
whenever possible, hence fuzzy-processing preference (Reyna, 2012). Adults 
begin with the lowest, or categorical, level of gist, and only proceed to higher, or 
more precise, levels when the lower levels do not discriminate between options 
enough to allow them to complete a task, such as choosing between two options 
in a choice task (Reyna, 2015, 2012). For example, problems with choices 
phrases as “less money is won” or “more money is won” represent more precise 
levels of gist than “some money is won” or “no money is won” (Reyna, 2012). 
The Influence of Verbatim and Gist Processing on Decision-Making 
Based on previous research, Reyna and Brainerd (2011) identified five 
components of decision-making including: 1) stored knowledge or values, 2) 
mental representations of problems or situations, 3) retrieval of knowledge and 
values, 4) implementation of knowledge and values, and 5) individual and 
developmental differences in monitoring and inhibiting interference, all of which 
can contribute to reasoning and decision-making. Stored knowledge and values 
refer to long-term education, experiences, and instilled values from childhood, 
including cultural values (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Mental representations refer 
to two distinct ways individuals perceive situations, either gist-based or verbatim-
based processing (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Gist processing is qualitative and 
draws on meaning and components extracted from the information presented, 
including emotional meaning (Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008; Reyna, 2012, 2004; 
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Reyna et al., 2015). Reyna and Brainerd (2011) explain that the meaning of the 
gist of a problem or situation is subjectively based on emotion, education, culture, 
experience, and worldview (Reyna, 2008, 2004; Reyna & Adam, 2003). When 
applied to decisions, gist-based processing relies on intuitive and global 
assessments, rather than trading-off between values, or a cost-benefit analysis. 
For instance, if confronted with a problem or situation that requires a decision, 
gist-based processing would involve a global assessment of risk (e.g., “Is there 
risk involved?”) as opposed to calculating risks (e.g., “Do the benefits outweigh 
the risks?”). On the contrary, when applied to decisions, verbatim-processes are 
specific and involve quantitative analysis (e.g., “How much risk is there?”). 
Retrieval of relevant values is an important part of the decision process, as 
people must access what is valuable to them in each situation; although, even 
deeply held values may not be retrieved when needed, introducing variance 
within individuals in reasoning and decision-making (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). 
Implementation is putting together what is perceived about a situation (i.e., 
mental representations) with what is known and valued (gist representations that 
are retrieved from long-term memory) by the decision-maker (Reyna & Brainerd, 
2011). In other words, when confronted with a decision, it is important to use 
personal values (e.g., “I want to be a law-abiding citizen.”) and to understand the 
fundamental meaning of the problem or situation (i.e., knowledge; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2011). When people fail to do this and only pay attention to superficial 
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details (e.g., numbers involved or exact phrasing of a problem) variability in their 
reasoning occurs as implicated by decisions in choice tasks. The assumptions 
are, according to fuzzy-trace theory, that this likely occurs because numbers are 
not properly stored in long-term memory, and that retrieval of values are 
unreliable in differing situations because they rely on specific cues for retrieval 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). 
Verbatim and Gist Preference Shifts in Decision-Making 
Traditional theories of rationality provided a consistency criterion; that is, 
different reasoning problems should be treated consistently across trials (De 
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Reyna, 2004). For instance, if an 
individual chooses to undergo surgery described as having an 80% survival rate, 
the individual should also choose to undergo surgery described as having a 20% 
mortality rate because they are mathematically equivalent choices (Reyna, 
2004). However, this is not necessarily the case in fuzzy-trace theory. What we 
see, instead, is preference shifts because of the way a decision task is phrased 
(i.e., in terms of loss or gains) because dependence on gist representations and 
the application of values and principles favors options differently across frames 
(Broniatowski & Reyna, 2018; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). This lack of 
consistency, not often displayed in younger children, suggests that adults are 
less rational than children are in decision tasks; however, fuzzy-trace theory 
argues that reliance on gist, which produces inconsistency, is the zenith of 
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development and rationality (Levin, Weller, Pederson, & Harshman, 2007; Reyna 
& Ellis, 1994). Decisions become more efficient, quicker, and often protective 
against unnecessary risks, thus increasing survival for the developed individual 
(Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Risk Perception vs. Risk-Taking 
Risk-taking can, at times, incur high damage and healthcare costs, and 
lost potential for people and their communities (Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008). 
For example, if a young person makes the risky decision to drink and drive and 
the result of that decision was a fatal accident, there is lost potential of life and 
costs to repair and replace damaged property. Researchers predict that risk 
perception and risk-taking behavior are negatively correlated, or that perceived 
risk is protective. For some, the higher the perceived risk of a behavior, the lower 
the tendency to engage in the behavior (Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, & Herrington, 
2004; Mills et al., 2008). Ironically, the opposite relationship (a positive 
correlation between risk perception and behavior) has also been observed: the 
higher the perceived risk, the greater the tendency to engage in the behavior 
(Johnson, McCaul, & Klein, 2002; Mills et al., 2008; Reyna & Farley, 2006). 
Fuzzy-trace theory explains these seemingly contradictory findings by positing 
that specific cues related to gist and verbatim representations elicit sometimes 
positive (when verbatim is applied) and sometimes negative (when gist is 
applied) relations between risk perception and risk-taking (Mills et al., 2008). For 
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example, asking an individual a question about the likelihood of getting arrested 
for a crime in the next six months can cause an individual to recall specific 
memories (verbatim), such as the number of crimes or offenses the individual 
has recently committed (Mills et al., 2008). In contrast, asking an individual 
whether they intend to engage in risky-behavior may produce a focus on the 
negative consequences of risk, hence leading to a negative relationship between 
risk-perception and risk-taking (Mills et al., 2008). 
Susceptibility to Risk Based on Gist or Verbatim Preference 
Fuzzy-trace theory states that people differ when thinking about risk 
across a continuum of verbatim to gist. At one end of the continuum is qualitative 
thinking, or using simple gist representations, such as “don’t go to jail.” On the 
other end is quantitative thinking using verbatim representations wherein the 
individual trades off risks and rewards (Mills et al., 2008). Thus, the latter thinking 
preference is more susceptible to increased risk-taking behaviors, because 
trading off the magnitude of risks versus the magnitude of rewards typically 
favors risk-taking (Mills et al., 2008; Reyna, Wilhems, McCormick, & Weldon, 
2015). More specifically, the decision maker who trades off (i.e., thinks 
analytically) can perceive the magnitude of benefits as better than the magnitude 
of risk involved (Mills et al., 2008). On the other hand, the decision maker who 
avoids risk altogether ignores the magnitude of the possible benefits and thus, is 
protective of risk (Mills et al., 2008; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006). 
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For example, adolescents who think about risk in terms of gist perceive risk as 
categorically bad and risk as high; therefore, they avoid risky behavior altogether 
(Reyna & Casillas, 2009; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna & Farley, 2006).  
Framing Effects 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), a “decision frame” is the 
decision maker’s concept of the performances, outcomes, and likelihoods 
associated with an option. The decision frame conception is dependent, in part, 
upon the formulation of the problem, in addition to norms, habits, and personal 
characteristics of the person (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Classic rational 
choice requires that the preference between options should not reverse with 
changes of frame when options remain mathematically equivalent; for example, 
preferring to purchase meat described as 90% lean, but avoiding purchasing 
when the meat is described as 10% fat. Framing effects occur when an 
objectively identical decision is phrased in terms of gains or losses, provoking 
different preferences for risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Classically, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) developed the Asian Disease Problem to exemplify 
framing effects:  
Preamble: The U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of a mysterious disease 
originating in the Asian-Pacific region, which is expected to kill around 600 
people. The CDC proposes 2 alternative programs to combat the disease 
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assuming the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the 
programs are as followed: 
Option 1: varies in terms of program options and is presented in terms of 
gains) “If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved (72 percent 
chance). If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people 
will be saved, and 2/3 probabilities that no people will be saved (28 
percent chance).” 
After presenting the problem, participants chose between programs. Despite the 
two choice options having equal expected values, the majority choice turns out to 
be risk-averse, because the prospect of saving 200 lives is more attractive than 
the possibility of saving zero lives (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The alternative 
“frame” in which the options were presented was as follows: 
Option 2: (varies in terms of program options and is presented in terms of 
loss) 
“If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die (22 percent). If Program D is 
adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
600 people will die (78 percent).” 
The majority choice in this case, despite equal expected values between options, 
is risk taking, because the certain death of 400 people is less attractive than the 
high 2/3 probability that 600 will die (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
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The only difference between the two problems is the phrasing in terms of 
gains (option 1, lives saved) or losses (option 2, lives lost; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981). Framing effects provide a problem for classic decision theory because in 
classical decision theory, a large assumption of rationality was that preferences 
remain constant across options no matter the phrasing (De Martino et al., 2006; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Nevertheless, the pattern observed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) using the classic Asian Disease Problem is commonly found in 
decision-making research: Choices phrased in terms of gains are often risk 
averse, whereas choices phrased in terms of losses are risk seeking (De Martino 
et al., 2006). If someone chooses a sure outcome over a gamble with equal or 
greater expected value, their choice is considered risk-averse, but if the opposite 
is observed and the individual chooses a gamble over sure option with equal or 
lower expected values, their choice is then considered risk-seeking (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). This pattern of preference is standard in adult bias and is 
referred to as “standard framing” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  
Fuzzy-trace theory explains framing effects in terms of applying verbatim 
or gist to decisions in framing tasks, producing three distinct patterns of choice 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna et al., 2011). First, gist-
based processing often supports framing effects. Participants in these tasks 
focus information first on losses, and work to minimize loss in both frames. For 
gains, minimizing loss means choosing the sure option. For losses, since a loss 
 
 
10 
 
is certain for the sure option, the chance to minimize loss is present in the 
gamble option. Thus, reliance on gist-based processing leads to observed 
standard framing effects. Reliance on verbatim-based processing leads to two 
patterns: consistency across frames and reverse framing.  
Determining Gist or Verbatim in Participant Responses 
Framing effects, or “standard framing,” are solely associated with gist-
based decision-making in risky-choice framing tasks, the preferred mode of 
thinking for most adults (Reyna et al., 2018). Standard framing is a choice pattern 
of preferring sure options when options are framed in terms of gains (e.g., 
survival, winning money) but preferring the gamble when options are framed as 
losses (e.g., mortality, losing money). Standard framing is related to gist 
processing because when the simple, categorical representation is not there, 
framing effects are not observed (Reyna et al., 2018). The opposite pattern of 
choice (i.e., choosing the sure loss and the risky gain) is called “reverse framing,” 
or “framing-inconsistent choice” (Reyna et al., 2018). Reyna and colleagues 
(2018) explain that reverse framing is more evident when there is a greater 
distinction between reward outcomes because reliance on precise distinctions 
between outcomes (i.e., verbatim) rather than fuzzy representations that ignore 
detail (i.e., gist) produces a cost/benefit analysis that favors the sure option in the 
loss frame, but favors the gamble option in the gain frame. This indicates that 
reverse framing is prevalent when the decision maker uses verbatim processing.  
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Impulsivity/Inhibition and Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
When learning about gist preference choices in fuzzy-trace theory it might 
be tempting to say that intuition is simply impulsivity, or lack of inhibition. 
However, research using the fuzzy-trace theory framework separates intuition 
from impulsivity (Reyna, 2012). Specifically, gist-based intuition is a skill that 
increases from childhood through adulthood, and is linked to inhibition, or 
cognitive control (Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Reyna & Rivers, 2008). 
In fuzzy-trace theory, inhibition is not a reasoning mode, but rather, works to 
withhold thoughts and actions as needed (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Impulsivity 
likely declines with age due to maturation of the prefrontal cortex, which includes 
increased white-matter connectivity between cortical and subcortical limbic areas 
of the brain (Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Inhibition, 
or cognitive control over one’s behavior, is dependent on gist representations 
because they are meaningful and impressionistic – decision factors that have 
been shown to reduce unhealthy risky behaviors (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; 
Reyna et al., 2018). Behavioral inhibition accounts for variance in people’s 
decisions in risky-choice problems (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Zuckerman, 1979). 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory, Risk-Taking, Criminal Behaviors, and the Brain 
Given that crimes are decisions that involve risk suggests that fuzzy-trace 
theory can be applied to criminal behavior and risk. Crime can be analyzed as 
reasoned, or thought out, choice that balances risks (e.g., getting caught and 
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going to jail) versus rewards (e.g., gaining monetary possessions to sell) and as 
impulsive or reactive, indicating emotions or desires that supplant a person’s self-
control (Casey, Galván, & Somerville, 2016; Reyna, Helm, Weldon, Shah, Turpin, 
& Govindgari, 2018). Like prior research, fuzzy-trace theory incorporates 
influences such as reward sensitivity, emotion, and failures of inhibition on risky 
decision-making tendencies (Reyna & Casillas, 2009; Reyna et al., 2018, 2015). 
The largest difference is that fuzzy-trace theory incorporates a cognitive 
distinction between gist and verbatim mental representations relied on in 
decision-making (Reyna et al., 2018). Criminal behavior is an example of 
heightened risk-taking behavior that peaks in adolescence for most individuals 
but persists through adulthood for some (Cohen & Casey, 2014; Moffitt, 1993; 
Reyna et al., 2018). Cohen and Casey (2014) refer to an “age-crime curve,” or 
the introduction of criminal behavior that begins in adolescence and peaks at age 
17. This implies that criminal behavior is reflective of developmentally immature 
thinking patterns. The different preferences in risk taking behavior can be 
explained by developmental and individual differences that affect reliance on gist 
or verbatim representations (Reyna et al., 2018). Reyna and colleagues (2018) 
posit that with respect to crime, those engaged in criminal behavior are more apt 
to use trading off and analysis of risk and reward that supports risk-taking (i.e., 
committing the crime) rather than deterrence, and are supported by verbatim 
representations of risk.  
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Crime and Thinking Styles 
Over the years, several researchers have attempted to explain criminal 
behavior with development of theories such as social disorganization theory 
(Shaw & McKay, 1942); social learning theory (Burgess & Akers, 1966); strain 
theory (Agnew, 1985; Merton, 1938); and rational-choice theory (Cornish & 
Clarke, 1986). Social disorganization theory explains delinquent behavior by 
socio-economic status and in relation to geographic location (Shaw & McKay, 
1942). Like social disorganization theory, social learning theory proposes that 
behavior is learned from a person’s environment (Burgess & Akers, 1966). 
However, this theory focuses more on learned behavior from others over 
geography. Strain theory proposes that criminal behavior stems from the 
emergence of unstable social structures and blocked opportunity for achievement 
(Agnew, 1985; Merton, 1938). Most closely related to fuzzy-trace theory, rational-
choice theory posits that people are rational decision makers who weigh costs 
and benefits to make the most utilitarian decision (Cornish & Clarke, 1986).  
Fuzzy-trace theory characterizes crime as highly risky behavior, and so it 
is important to understand how risk-perception plays a part in the engagement of 
criminal activity, and further, how each mode of thinking supports and predicts 
risk-taking. The current study uses fuzzy-trace theory to explore how preferred 
modes of thinking, risk perception, and criminal behavior are related. We first 
hypothesize that if we frame criminal activity as risky behavior, we should find 
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similar thinking processes underlying both risk-taking and criminal behavior. As 
explained, verbatim processing is supportive of risk-taking, while gist is protective 
of risk-taking. Therefore, we can expect to see criminal behavior positively 
correlated with reverse framing in a framing choice task, given that reverse 
framing is indicative of verbatim processing. We also endeavor to distinguish 
patterns related to gist/verbatim processing of choice from impulsivity, or 
inhibition. Finally, we will explore integrating common thinking patterns found in 
criminal behavior with fuzzy-trace theory. 
Implications of Research 
Real-World Problem: Court Decisions by Young People 
Fuzzy trace-theory suggests that despite an individual’s capability for 
understanding and reasoning, there are some who may have a lower capacity for 
making value-based decisions when faced with tempting offers, such as whether 
to engage in a criminal act (Helm & Reyna, 2017). The implication is that it is 
important for individuals facing a plea, bargain, or other risky choice, to make 
decisions based on their values (meaning-based representations) rather than the 
immediate cost-benefit choices when weighing their options (Helm & Reyna, 
2017). Furthermore, if young adults who prefer verbatim processing are also 
observed to be more likely to commit criminal offenses (i.e., acts that are in 
violation of the law), we can reduce their chances of future offenses with gist-
based interventions, such as curriculum using gist processing (Reyna et al., 
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2018). Using gist representations instead of verbatim representations when 
processing information, such as cueing a “moral” value (e.g., “I can go to jail if I 
get caught”) instead of trading off risks and rewards (e.g., “If I am caught, the fine 
for stealing is $200, but if I am successful, I can get $200 from pawning this 
game console”), has been found to reduce unhealthy risk-taking (Blalock & 
Reyna, 2016; Reyna et al., 2018). This implies that with respect to criminal 
behavior, gist-based interventions should have a protective effect against 
criminal behavior, even when the risk is low, and the benefits are high (Reyna et 
al., 2018).  
Remember that fuzzy-trace theory suggests some people simply do not 
rely on gist when faced with tempting rewards (Helm & Reyna, 2017). This study 
adds to our understanding of decision-making processes in young adults when 
confronted with risk and increases our understanding of factors that may lead to 
criminal behavior. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate research pool from the 
psychology department at Stephen F. Austin State University. Of the total 
number of participants, one was excluded due to corrupt data from the framing 
task, leaving 101 total participants. Participants were reflective of SFA’s 
demographics; that is, mostly White (N = 60; 59.4%), Non-Hispanic (N = 76; 
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75.2%), female (N = 80; 79.2%), and between the ages of 18 and 43 (M = 19.97; 
SD = 3.15). Participants received one research credit toward satisfying course 
requirements for their participation.  
Design 
The study used a mixed measures approach. The experimental 
component of our study was a 2 (Frame: Gain, Loss) x 3 (Reward: Small, 
Intermediate, Large) x 3 (Risk: Low, Medium, High) completely factorial within-
participants design. The correlational aspect involved a survey to measure 
criminal thinking, risk-taking and criminal behavior, and impulsivity. Each scale 
was presented in blocks and each block was presented in a randomized order for 
each participant. A Cronbach’s Alpha score was calculated to measure internal 
consistency of our scales, resulting in a high level of internal consistency with the 
average Cronbach’s alpha of all scales (α) = .855. 
Risky-Choice Framing Problems  
The framing task included 18 risky-choice problems, counterbalanced for 
whether the sure option was presented on the left or right across participants. In 
this experiment, participants were tasked with choosing between a sure option 
and a gamble option (i.e., the risky option). Both options in every decision 
problem had equal expected values to determine thinking preference patterns, 
including expected preference shifts. Each problem was a factorial combination 
of a level of Frame, Risk, and Reward. There were 2 frames (a gain frame and a 
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loss frame); 3 levels of risk (i.e., low, medium, and high); and 3 levels of reward 
(i.e., small, intermediate, and large). The three levels of risk are set at probable 
chances of the risky option occurring in the gamble of an outcome (i.e., low=0.4, 
medium=0.6, high=0.8). And the three levels of reward are set at low (small), 
medium (intermediate), and high (large); the amount is dependent on the 
problem and level of risk involved as determined by calculating equal expected 
values for each level. An example of a small reward gain frame problem (i.e., 
Gain, Small Reward, Low Risk) involved a 100% chance of gaining an ostensible 
$5 endowment in the sure option, or the 60% possibility of gaining $10 or $0 in 
the gamble option, each with an expected value (EV) of 5, which is consistent 
across both sure and gamble options. The loss frame problems are 
mathematically identical, save for a varying endowment amount given at the 
beginning of each problem and the chances are against them (or they face a 
large chance loss in the gamble frame or a smaller sure loss in the sure frame).  
In an example of large reward in a high-risk loss frame (i.e., Loss, Large 
Reward, High Risk), a participant was given an endowment of $720 at the 
beginning of the problem. The participant then chose between the sure option 
(100% chance) of losing $576, and the gamble option (0.8 or 80% of losing all, 
and 0.2 or 20% chance of losing nothing) with the possibilities of losing either 
$720 or $0 (see Appendix A for a full description of all stimuli).  
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Decision Response 
Decision responses were recorded for each individual risky-choice framing 
problem using E-Prime 2.0 survey software. 
Adolescent Risk-Taking Questionnaire (ARQ) 
Participants completed the Adolescent Risk-Taking Questionnaire (ARQ) 
to assess risk-taking from self-reported risky behaviors they have participated in. 
The questionnaire includes 22 items separated into four subscales: 1) thrill-
seeking behaviors (e.g., parachuting, roller blading); 2) rebellious behaviors (e.g., 
drinking, smoking, using illegal drugs); 3) reckless behaviors (e.g., drinking and 
driving, racing, having unprotected sex); and 4) antisocial behaviors (e.g., 
cheating, teasing people) (Gullone, Moore, Moss, & Boyd, 2002). The response 
format is in the form of a 5-point Likert scale from never done to done very often 
(i.e., never do, hardly ever do, do sometimes, do often, do very often). Total 
scores for risk-taking behavior were calculated by summing each subscale for 
each participant (Min = 0, Max = 88). 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) 
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 
1995) is a self-report questionnaire designed to assess the personality and 
behavioral construct of impulsiveness. The scale has been used reliably in 
research for over 50 years and is currently in its 11th revision (Barratt, 1959; 
Patton et al., 1995). The 30-item questionnaire describes common impulsive 
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behaviors and preferences as well as accounting for non-impulsive behaviors 
(indicated by reverse-scoring) reported on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 
rarely/never to almost always/always (i.e., rarely/never, occasionally, often, 
almost always/always) and separated into three subscales: 1) attentional 
impulsiveness (e.g., “I have racing thoughts,” “I squirm at plays or lectures”); 2) 
motor impulsiveness (e.g., “I do things without thinking,” “I act on the spur of the 
moment”); and 3) nonplanning impulsiveness (e.g., “I plan tasks carefully,” “I am 
more interested in the present than the future” ) (Patton et al., 1995). A total 
impulsivity score was calculated by summing the subscales for each participant, 
including reverse-scored items properly calculated for each subscale as 
instructed by Patton and colleagues (1995) (Min = 30, Max = 120).  
TCU Criminal Thinking Scales (CTS) 
The TCU Criminal Thinking Scales (CTS) is a 36-item scale intended to 
measure self-reported thinking patterns related to Entitlement, Justification, 
Personal Irresponsibility, Power Orientation, Cold Heartedness, and Criminal 
Rationalization. Entitlement (EN), at its core, conveys a sense of ownership and 
privilege. Individuals who score high on the EN scale believe that they deserve 
special consideration and that the world owes them (Knight, Garner, Simpson, 
Morey, & Flynn, 2006). Justification (JU) reflects a thinking pattern characterized 
by the offender’s minimizing the seriousness of antisocial acts and justifying 
those actions based on external circumstances (Knight et al., 2006). Individuals 
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who score high on this scale portray their antisocial acts as permissible due to 
perceived social injustice (Knight et al., 2006). Personal Irresponsibility (PI) 
assesses the degree to which an individual is willing to take ownership for their 
actions, particularly criminal actions (Knight et al., 2006). High scores suggest an 
individual’s unwillingness to accept responsibility for their actions and are 
associated with the individual blaming others for their behavior (Knight et al., 
2006). Power Orientation (PO) measures a need for power and control (Knight et 
al., 2006). Offenders who score high on the PO scale typically show an outward 
display of aggression to control their external environment, and they try to 
achieve a sense of power by manipulating others. Cold Heartedness (CH) 
addresses callousness toward others, and high scores on this scale indicate lack 
of emotional depth in personal relationships (Knight et al., 2006). Lastly, Criminal 
Rationalization (CN) assesses negative viewpoints about the law and authority 
figures (Knight et al., 2006). High scores on the CN scale reflect that the 
individual believes their actions are no different than criminal acts authority 
figures commit on a regular basis (Knight et al., 2006). Each scale was adapted 
for use in our college-aged non-incarcerated population. For example, questions 
that asked about the crime the perpetrator committed in the original study were 
changed to speculative (“if you were to commit a crime…”). The response format 
for the CTS is reported on a 5-point Likert scale from disagree strongly to agree 
strongly (i.e., disagree strongly, disagree, uncertain, agree, agree strongly). A 
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total CTS score was calculated by summing each scale, including reverse-coded 
items on the CH and CN scales as indicated by Knight and colleagues (2006) 
(Min = 36, Max = 180).  
Procedure 
After reading and signing a consent form, all participants completed the 
framing decision task, where they were shown 18 framing problems complete 
with equal amounts of gain (n = 9) and loss (n = 9) frames in random order using 
E-Prime 2.0 software. Each participant was randomly assigned to see all choices 
with the sure option on the left (n = 50) or sure option on the right (n = 51) for 
counterbalancing. Participants assessed their own risky behavior by completing 
the Adolescent Risk-taking Questionnaire (ARQ). Participants also completed the 
TCU Criminal Thinking Scales (CTS), a self-report assessment for thinking 
patterns associated with incarcerated criminals and adapted for use with a non-
criminal college-aged population, and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) in 
order to account for impulsive decision-making, or lack of inhibition, in 
participants’ answers. Scales were presented in blocks and each block was 
presented in random order using Qualtrics survey software for each participant. 
Before finalizing, participants completed a brief survey to capture demographic 
information about our sample.  
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Results 
Framing Choice  
First, a repeated-measures analysis of variance was performed to 
examine differences in choice across our participants, examining the influences 
of frame, risk, and reward. Overall, each of the 101 participants completed 18 
problems (ntotal = 909 gain frames; ntotal =909 loss frames). A framing task score 
was created by subtracting the proportion of times the participant chose the 
gamble option in the loss frame from the proportion of times the participant chose 
the gamble in the gain frame, with negative scores indicating standard framing 
and positive scores indicating reverse framing.  
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Figure 1. Mean proportion of times gamble chosen and standard deviations 
based on participant choice in gain and loss frames. Error bars (95% CI) 
indicated +/- range of one standard deviation. 
 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not met for 
reward, χ2(2) = 9.56, p = .008 or risk, χ2(2) = 12.94, p = .002. To correct against 
violations of sphericity, we reported Greenhouse-Geisser values for those 
variables (ε = .916; ε = .891). A statistically significant effect of framing on choice 
was found in our sample F(1, 100) = 4.260, p = .004, ηp² = .080. A reverse 
framing pattern was found to emerge overall in that participants chose the 
gamble option more often in the gain frame than the loss frame (Mgain =.528, SD 
= .024; Mloss=.431, SD = .025, see figure 1).  
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Figure 2. Mean risk scores and standard deviations based on gamble choice 
across frames. Error bars (95% CI) indicated +/- range of one standard deviation. 
 
The results show there was a significant effect of risk on taking the 
gamble, F(1.78, 178.2) = 17.103, p = .000, ηp² = .274. Participants chose the 
gamble less as risk increased from a low level of risk (M =.612, SD = .024) to 
medium risk (M=.444, SD = .029) to high risk (M =.383, SD = .026) (see figure 2). 
This suggests that participants were sensitive to and avoidant of risk, but only if 
the risk was large enough (i.e., greater than 50/50).  
 
Figure 3. Mean reward scores and standard deviations based on gamble choice 
across frames. Error bars (95% CI) indicated +/- range of one standard deviation. 
 
A significant effect of reward on taking the gamble was also found, 
F(183.3, 183.1) = 1.407, p = .037, ηp² = .057. Participants chose the gamble less 
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often in the high reward condition (M =.441, SD = .022) versus the medium (M 
=.495, SD = .023) or low reward conditions (M =.503, SD = .025). This effect 
could be driven by an increase in appeal as the sure option becomes larger. 
However, the effect could also be driven by avoidance of the large loss in the 
gamble option. The current study cannot parse out which process is governing 
responses. Given no interactions were found, these effects drove choice 
independent of each other. 
Framing Effects, Impulsivity, and Risk-Taking 
 A multiple regression was conducted to analyze the predictive influence 
framing scores and impulsivity had on risk-taking (M = -2.82, SD = 0.98). The 
results of the regression indicated the two predictors were moderately predictive 
of risk-taking (R2 = .053, F(2, 98) = 2.742, p = .069, see table 1). Consistent with 
previous research, it was found that impulsivity was predictive of risky behaviors 
in our sample (β = .23, [.025, 347], p = .024) but not overall framing scores, (β = -
.034, [-.626, .442], p = .733). 
Framing and Impulsivity Regression Model 
 Variable b Std. 
Error 
β p R2 
 
Model 1       
 
 Framing Score -.092 .269 -.034 .733 .053 
 
 Impulsivity .186 .081 .226 .024 
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Table 1. Regression table describing framing score and impulsivity predictive 
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking 
assessment scores. 
 
 A second regression was performed and showed that, specifically, motor 
impulsivity but no other subscale of impulsivity was most predictive of risky 
behavior (β = .22, [-.012, .095], p = .061; R2 = .074, F(4, 96) = 1.929, p = .061, 
see table 2).  
Impulsivity Subscales Regression Model 
 Variable b Std. 
Error 
β p R2 
Model 1       
 
 Attentional Impulsivity -.135 .244 -.065 .581 .074 
 
 Motor Impulsivity .469 .242 .223 .056 
 
 
 Non-planning Impulsivity    .224 .202 .202 .269  
 
Table 2. Regression table describing impulsivity subscales predictive strength, 
significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking assessment scores. 
 
What Thinking Styles Predict Reverse Framing? 
 A multiple regression was conducted to analyze what criminal thinking 
styles might predict framing effects, particularly the reverse framing pattern that 
emerged in our sample. Framing scores were regressed onto each subscale of 
criminal thinking styles. Overall, the subscales for criminal thinking styles were 
not significant predictors for framing scores, R2 = .109, F(6, 94) = 1.908, p = .087 
(see table 3). However, we found that criminal rationalization was significantly 
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predictive of framing effects (β = .287, [.046, .392] p = .013) and that power 
orientation was a marginally significant predictor of framing effects (β = -.223, p = 
.066).  
 
Table 3. Regression table describing criminal thinking styles subscales predictive 
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on framing task scores. 
 
What Thinking Styles Predict Risk-Taking? 
 A multiple regression was run to explore if criminal thinking styles predict 
risk-taking, and if so, what particular subscales might predict risk-taking. An 
overall criminal thinking score was significantly predictive of risk-taking (β = .257, 
[.039, .271], p = .010; R2 = .066, F(1, 99) = 6.986, see table 4).  
  
Thinking Styles on Framing Scores Regression Model 
 Variable b Std. 
Error 
β p R2 
 
Model 1       
 
 Entitlement -.135 .141 -.149 .342 .109 
 
 Justification .091 .140 .096 .517 
 
 
 Power Orientation -.166 .089 -.223 .066  
 
 Cold Heartedness .115 .124 .097 .355  
 
 Criminal Rationalization .219 .087 .287 .013  
 
 Personal Irresponsibility -.086 .132 -.087 .517  
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Thinking Styles Total Regression Model 
 Variable b Std. 
Error 
β p R2 
 
Model 1       
 
 CTS Total .155 .058 .257 .010 .066 
 
 
Table 4. Regression table describing criminal thinking style total scores predictive 
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking 
assessment scores. 
 
A second multiple regression was conducted to further explore which 
subsets of the criminal thinking scales were most predictive of risk-taking. The 
findings indicated that the subscales significantly predicted risk-taking, (R2 = 
.123, F(6, 94) = 2.187, p = .051, see table 5). The subscale found justification to 
be most predictive of risky behavior, (β = .277, [-.038, 1.468], p = .063, see table 
5). 
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Thinking Styles on Risk-Taking Regression Model 
 Variable b Std. 
Error 
β p R2 
 
Model 1       
 
 Entitlement .087 .383 .035 .821 .123 
 
 Justification .715 .379 .277 .063 
 
 
 Power Orientation .024 .242 .012 .920  
 
 Cold Heartedness -.314 .336 -.097 .352  
 
 Criminal Rationalization .302 .236 .145 .204  
 
 Personal Irresponsibility -.165 .356 -.062 .645  
 
Table 5. Regression table describing criminal thinking subscales predictive 
strength, significance, and explanatory power of model on risk-taking 
assessment scores. 
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Discussion 
Framing Choice 
A statistically significant effect of framing on choice was found in our 
sample. However, inconsistent with previous research, a reverse framing pattern 
was found to emerge overall in that participants chose the gamble (risky) option 
more often in the gain frame than in the loss frame. Notably, a follow-up analysis 
showed that participants chose the gamble option more often in the sure right 
condition where they saw the gamble option first. This suggests a potential serial 
positioning bias in our sample, a phenomenon that affects attentional processes 
dependent on script direction (Bettinsoli, Maass, & Suitner, 2019). We did not 
exclusively see standard framing choices in the sure left condition. However, 
there was an increase in reverse framing present when the gamble option was 
on the left. This counter-normative result may be due to the proposed serial 
positioning bias, which warrants further exploration. Consistent with previous 
research, there was a significant effect of risk on taking the gamble in that the 
choice of gamble decreased as risk increased across frames. There was also a 
significant effect of reward on choice. Given that these main effects emerged 
independent of interactions suggests that choice of the gamble can be driven by 
individuals focusing on the reward or focusing on the risk, but our participants 
tended not to be influenced by the combination of items. This is inconsistent with 
rational choice theory, which states that decision makers use all information 
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available in their choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In addition, the result is 
not fully in support of fuzzy-trace theory, in that previous reports have found 
standard framing using a similar task (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991; Reyna & Ellis, 
1994); however, using less information to arrive at a decision is at the core of 
fuzzy-trace theory, so the results are partially consistent with fuzzy-trace theory. 
Framing Effects, Impulsivity, and Risk-Taking 
Since impulsivity is not a part of the underlying thinking styles suggested 
in fuzzy-trace theory but an impetus to taking risk, we expected impulsivity to be 
positively related to choosing a gamble, i.e. taking risks, but not to the framing 
score. The results suggest that participants’ framing score was not a good 
predictor of risk-taking. However, impulsivity, especially motor impulsivity, was 
found to be predictive of risk-taking. This result might be explained in 
combination with previously suggested serial positioning bias (Bettinsoli et al., 
2018). In other words, when participants saw something they liked first (i.e., 
higher reward on the left), they were drawn to choose that option more often as 
impulsivity increased. This result is consistent with previous research showing 
that impulsivity is a strong predictor of risk-taking (Zuckerman, 1979).  
What Thinking Style Predicts Reverse Framing? 
Based on the implications of fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects, we 
planned to observe that young adults who prefer verbatim processing would also 
be more likely to take risks, including criminal risks. Although the tendency to 
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rationalize was related to the tendency to reverse frame in choice, framing scores 
were not predictive of risk-taking. However, we found that criminal rationalization 
was significantly predictive of framing effects, as fuzzy-trace theory would 
suggest. We originally predicted that justification would be predictive of reverse 
framing as a verbatim-related measure of criminal thinking styles, but results did 
not support that hypothesis. Instead, the power orientation subscale was found to 
be moderately predictive of reverse framing effects. There is not a clear 
understanding of this relationship between power orientation and framing scores. 
It is possible that these results are reflective of the lack of criminal activity and 
phrasing in the power orientation items. Statements for power orientation involve 
the concept of control and are not necessarily related to crime or court 
proceedings like most of the other criminal thinking subscales. This would not 
activate gist-related biases (i.e., avoiding associations with criminal labels or 
criminal risks) as much for our non-criminal sample, possibly driving the results 
observed between power orientation and reverse framing. Overall, the individual 
subscales for criminal thinking styles were not significant predictors for framing 
scores.  
What Thinking Styles Predict Risk-Taking? 
Our results indicated an overall criminal thinking score was predictive of 
risk-taking behavior. We proposed that the criminal rationalization and 
justification subscales of the CTS are related to verbatim-processing, as fuzzy-
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trace theory would suggest (Reyna et al., 2018). The findings indicated that a 
small portion of variance can be explained by the subscales and that the 
subscales overall significantly predicted risk-taking. Justification was moderately 
predictive of risk-taking, indicating those who use external circumstances as 
justification for antisocial acts are more likely to take risks (Knight et al., 2006). 
Therefore, it is not clear which specific criminal thinking styles might strongly 
predict risk-taking. Nevertheless, our results suggest there is a pattern to risk-
taking when taking multiple facets of criminal thinking into account. 
Implications 
 Consistent with previous research, our study found that there were 
significant differences among groups due to experimental conditions of frame, 
risk, and reward levels. In order to further understand what existing attributes 
influenced the decision-makers’ choice to take risk, we explored relationships 
between framing scores and risky behaviors, impulsivity, and criminal thinking 
styles. Although framing scores could not predict any of our participants’ existing 
attributes, some attributes were predictive of framing effects. Impulsivity was 
significantly predictive of risk-taking, particularly, motor impulsivity.  
We expected criminal rationalization to predictive of framing effects and in 
particular, reverse framing. This expectation was supported by our results, 
indicating that the existing thinking style is likely related to verbatim-processing 
when choosing to take risks in a framing task. We did not find the expectation 
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that justification was predictive of reverse framing. Instead, we found that power 
orientation was moderately predictive of reverse framing. As explained before, 
we believe this may be due to the phrasing in these control-related questions, 
which would not bring forth gist representation biases about criminals and 
criminal risk when participants were answering those questions in the risk-taking 
survey. This may have driven the relationship between power orientation and 
reverse framing.  
Finally, we explored what thinking styles are related to risk-taking and 
found that, overall, scores on the criminal thinking scales were predictive of risk-
taking. This supports previous findings by Knight and colleagues (2006). 
Contrary to our initial hypothesis, there was not a particular thinking style 
associated with predicting risk-taking. We predict that may have not been the 
case in a sample with greater risk-score variability.  
Limitations 
 A large limitation of this study includes non-diverse demographics in our 
sample, including age-restriction and predominant sex and race representations. 
The participants were largely reflective of the population at SFA: the age-range 
was rather wide, but over half of our participants were between 19-20 years of 
age; only 21 males were represented in our sample of 101; and over half of our 
sample identified as White or European American. It is possible that range 
restriction in either verbatim/gist variation, a known developmental effect, or in 
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criminal thinking or risky behavior, both known to be greater for males than 
females, may have limited our ability to detect differences (Byrnes, Miller, & 
Schafer, 1999). For example, the total score one can obtain on the Adolescent 
Risk-taking Questionnaire is 88, while the mean scores for our sample were 43.6 
(SD = 8.1), with many scores even lower than that (Min = 28, Max = 69). Of note, 
our sample was college students and not convicted criminals in a prison 
population. It is possible that although young adults are likely to take risks, many 
college students do not engage in a large volume of criminal activity. We believe 
that the relationships we expected to see between risk-taking and our other 
variables would be present in a more diverse sample. 
Future Directions 
 As stated briefly in the discussion, future studies should explore where 
participants are looking first and what items they fixate on when participating in a 
framing choice task. This might rule out or further support the idea that serial 
positioning biases have a role in risky-decision making in framing tasks. Further, 
criminal rationalization was predictive of reverse framing in our sample. These 
items reflect subjectively negative views of justice and systematic issues, and our 
sample largely reflected those views in conjunction with using more reverse 
framing processes in decision making. This relationship should be explored 
further to add to our understanding of how criminal rationalization predicts 
reverse framing. A final suggestion is that future studies can look at the concept 
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of locus of control in relation to criminal thinking styles and fuzzy-trace theory. 
This may further explain how criminal rationalization is predictive of reverse 
framing, how justification is predictive of risk-taking, or why people choose the 
gamble option in framing tasks. For example, an internal locus of control may 
reflect more gist-based processing, indicating protective relationships between 
risk-perceptions and risk-taking, while an external locus of control may reflect 
verbatim processing, suggesting a positive relationship between risk-perception 
and risk-taking. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, results indicate that individuals did not take into 
consideration multiple factors when deciding to take a gamble or not but focused 
on either factors risk or reward, as no interaction between risk and reward was 
found. In support of previous findings, impulsivity was largely predictive of risk-
taking but not predictive of framing effects (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Zuckerman, 
1979). Moreover, motor impulsivity was specifically predictive of risk-taking. 
Criminal rationalization and power orientation were found to be significantly 
predictive of reverse framing, indicating these subscales may be most related to 
verbatim-processing in risky decisions. Overall higher scores on the CTS, 
measuring the tendency to endorse items found to be related to criminal 
behavior, were predictive of more general risk-taking, suggesting that analyzing 
criminal behavior as a form of risk-taking is warranted. In understanding the 
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precursors to criminal behavior, including how risk is conceptualized, processed, 
and values, more effective interventions centered around known relations of 
patterns of thinking to risk can aid in reduction of criminal activity. Further, 
understanding how risk perceptions may develop towards more protective as 
opposed to more reflective will further aid the effectiveness of interventions.
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APPENDIX A 
Risky-Choice Framing Problems 
GAIN FRAME         
Option Risk 0.4 0.6 0.8 
 Small Outcomes  EV = 12     
Sure   12 12 12 
Gamble   20,0 30,0 60,0 
 
Intermediate Outcomes  EV = 36 
  
Sure   36 36 36 
Gamble   60,0 90,0 180,0 
 Large Outcomes  EV = 144   
Sure 
   
144 
144 144 
Gamble   240,0 360,0 720,0 
     
LOSS FRAME         
Option Risk 0.4 0.6 0.8 
 Small Outcomes  EV = 12   
      
Endowment 20 30 60 
Sure 
   
-8 -18 -48 
Gamble   -20,0 -30,0 -60,0  
Intermediate Outcomes EV = 36  
 
 
  
 
  
 
Endowment 60 90 180 
Sure 
   
-24 -54 -144 
Gamble   -60,0 -90,0 -180,0 
 Large Outcomes  EV = 144   
  
 
 
 
Endowment 240 360 720 
Sure 
   
-96 -216 -576 
Gamble   -240,0 -360,0 -720,0 
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APPENDIX B 
Adolescent Risk-taking Questionnaire (ARQ) 
DIRECTIONS 
Below is written a list of behaviors some people engage in. Read each one carefully and select 
the box in front of the word that best describes your behavior. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
        Never Done    Hardly Ever Done     Done Sometimes    Done Often    Done Very Often 
1. Smoking     􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
2. Roller blading    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
3. Drinking and driving     􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
4. Parachuting     􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
5. Speeding     􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣  
6. Stealing cars and  
    going for joy rides    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
7. Tao Kwon Do fighting                􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
8. Underage drinking   􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
9. Staying out late    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
10. Driving without a  
      license    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
11. Talking to strangers   􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣  
12. Flying a plane    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
13. Cheating     􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
14. Getting drunk    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣  
15. Sniffing gas or glue    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣  
16. Having unprotected  
      sex                  􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣  
17. Leaving school   􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
18. Teasing and picking  
      on people     􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
19. Snow skiing    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
20. Taking drugs    􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
21. Overeating     􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣 
22. Entering a  
      competition       􀁣              􀁣         􀁣     􀁣               􀁣
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APPENDIX C 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) 
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to 
measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and put an X on the 
appropriate circle on the right side of this page. Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
Answer quickly and honestly. 
    Rarely/Never       Occasionally         Often       Almost Always/Always 
1. I plan tasks carefully.   􀁣   􀁣                  􀁣           􀁣 
2. I do things without thinking.   􀁣   􀁣                  􀁣           􀁣 
3. I make-up my mind quickly.   􀁣   􀁣                  􀁣           􀁣 
4. I am happy-go-lucky.   􀁣   􀁣                  􀁣           􀁣 
5. I don’t “pay attention.”   􀁣   􀁣                  􀁣           􀁣 
6. I have “racing” thoughts.   􀁣   􀁣                  􀁣           􀁣 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time.  􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
8. I am self-controlled.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
9. I concentrate easily.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
10. I save regularly.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures.  􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣  
12. I am a careful thinker.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣  
13. I plan for job security.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
14. I say things without thinking.  􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
15. I like to think about complex  
 problems.     􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
16. I change jobs.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
17. I act “on impulse.”    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
18. I get easily bored when solving  
 thought problems.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
19. I act on the spur of the moment.  􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
20. I am a steady thinker.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣  
21. I change residences.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣  
22. I buy things on impulse.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
23. I can only think about one thing at a  
 time     􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
24. I change hobbies.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
25. I spend or charge more than I earn.  􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
26. I often have extraneous thoughts  
 when thinking.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
27. I am more interested in the present  
 than the future.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
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28. I am restless at the theater or  
 during lectures.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
29. I like puzzles.    􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
30. I am future oriented.   􀁣   􀁣          􀁣           􀁣 
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APPENDIX D 
TCU Criminal Thinking Scales 
TCU CTSFORM 
 
Disagree Strongly     Disagree      Uncertain     Agree     Agree Strongly 
(1)                 (2)                  (3)     (4)          (5) 
Please indicate how much you AGREE or DISAGREE with each statement. 
 
 1. You get upset when you hear about  
someone who has lost everything  
in a natural disaster.  .................................       
 2. You got in trouble because you had  
a run of bad luck.  .....................................       
 3. The real reason you get in trouble is  
because of your race.  ..............................       
 4. When people tell you what to do,  
you become aggressive.  ..........................       
 5. Anything can be fixed in court if you  
have the right connections.  ......................       
 6. Seeing someone cry makes you sad.  .......       
 7. You rationalize your actions with  
statements like “Everyone else is  
doing it, so why shouldn’t I?”  ....................       
 8. Bankers, lawyers, and politicians get  
away with breaking the law every day.  .....       
 9. You have paid your dues in life and are  
justified in taking what you want.  ..............       
 10. When not in control of a situation,  
you feel the need to exert power  
over others.  ..............................................       
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 11. When being asked about the motives  
for engaging in illegal activity, you point  
  out how hard your life has been.  ..............       
12. You are sometimes so moved by an  
experience that you feel emotions  
you cannot describe.  ................................       
 13. You argue with others over relatively  
trivial matters.  ..........................................       
 14. If someone disrespects you then you  
have to straighten them out, even if you  
have to get physical.  ................................       
 15. You like to be in control.  ...........................       
 16. You find yourself blaming those affected 
by your illegal behavior.  ...........................       
 17. You feel people are important to you.  .......       
 18. This country’s justice system was  
designed to treat everyone equally.  .........       
 19. Police do worse things than do the  
“criminals” they lock up.  ...........................        
 20. You think you have to pay back people  
who mess with you.  ..................................       
 21. Nothing you do here is going to make a 
difference in the way you are treated.  ......       
 22.  You feel you are above the law.  ...............       
 23. It is okay to do illegal things in order to pay  
for the things you need. ............................       
 24. Society owes you a better life.  ..................       
 25. Breaking the law is no big deal as long  
as you do not physically harm someone.  .          
 26. You find yourself blaming society and  
external circumstances for the problems  
in your life.  ...............................................       
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 27. You worry when a friend is having  
problems.  .................................................       
 28. The only way to protect yourself  
is to be ready to fight.  ...............................       
 
 29. You are not to blame for everything  
you have done.  ........................................       
 30. It is unfair that you suffer the consequences  
  when bankers, lawyers, and politicians get  
away with their crimes.  .............................       
 31. Laws are just a way to keep poor people  
down.  .......................................................       
 32. Your good behavior should allow you  
to be irresponsible sometimes.  .................       
 33. It is okay to commit crime in order to  
live the life you deserve.  ...........................       
 34. Prosecutors often tell witnesses to lie  
in court.  ....................................................       
 35. You justify the illegal things you do by  
telling yourself that if you had not done  
it, someone else would have.  ...................       
 36. You may be a law-breaker, but your  
environment made you that way.  .............      
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